The introduction consists of an identification of the historical background: Hitler’s increasingly intensified holocaust at the end of the Second World War, leading to Wallenberg’s rescue mission in Budapest between late 1944 and the beginning of 1945.

The main part begins with giving necessary information about Wallenberg’s operation in Budapest, such as how and for whom he was employed and a short description of the nature and extent of his work. It continues by describing the circumstances surrounding the arrest and questioning who issued the arrest order. The remaining section of the main part is examining potential reasons behind the Soviet arrest of Wallenberg. Two main hypotheses are brought up. The first is based around the Soviet regime, being suspicious that Wallenberg’s activities were espionage for either Germany or USA/Britain. Secondly, the Soviet authorities might have wanted something in return for arresting Wallenberg, either in terms of information from Wallenberg himself, or use him as an exchange object in order to get back Soviet citizens. More speculative reasons are also accounted for. These include a possible recruitment of Wallenberg into the Soviet Secret Service, or a more idealistic viewpoint with regard to Wallenberg as a person, since he and his family were and still are a symbol for western capitalism.

The conclusion summarizes the different viewpoints and presents a concluding theory based around the uncertainty surrounding the arrest. Since this question could be answered by many valid arguments, the true answer could be that the Soviets justified their arrest in accordance with many different facts, meaning that there never was a single reason why the Soviet Regime issued the arrest order on Raoul Wallenberg.

Introduction

By the spring of 1944, Nazi extermination camps had annihilated more than a third of the Jewish population in Europe. Yet there was one large Jewish community remaining – in Hungary. The Jewish population here added up to about 700 000 people . In March 1944, Adolf Eichmann entered Budapest behind the German Army during its occupation of Hungary. Eichmann had direct orders from Adolf Hitler to round up and oversee the deportation of Hungary’s Jews. Germany had been defeated in Stalingrad and USSR was occupying large areas of land and began to approach Hungary. Hitler’s aims concerning European Jews were not completed and consequently the holocaust was hurried up. But during this time the world had started to realise the extent of Hitler’s ”final solution”. A variety of international agencies began to look for someone to attempt to save the remaining Hungarian Jewish community. United States President, Roosevelt, decided to establish the War Refugee Board (WRB) on 22 January 1944. The purpose of the WRB was to attempt to save as many threatened people as possible, especially Jews, in the occupied territories in Europe. The WRB contacted several neutral governments, including the Vatican, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal and Turkey, requesting help in organising rescue procedures. Sweden was approached through the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO). The result was an operation led by Raoul Gustav Wallenberg. He arrived in the Hungarian capital, Budapest, on Sunday 9 July 1944, with the mission of saving as many Jews possible from Nazi extermination camps. Despite the chaotic situation in Budapest and the lack of time, Wallenberg and his team managed with the heroic effort to save thousands of lives.

Yet in the month of January 1945, at the very end of the war, when his task seemed to have reached completion, Wallenberg was arrested by Soviet troops. Ever since, his fate has attracted the attention and imagination of many people around the globe. Much focus has been directed towards the mysterious disappearance of Wallenberg after his arrest and imprisonment, which is a question that probably will remain a mystery. An interesting fact that may appear as dimmed as the disappearance is the reason behind the Soviet arrest on Wallenberg. This Extended Essay is an attempt to establish why Wallenberg was captured using a variety of sources including recently discovered evidence.

Upon Wallenberg’s arrival in Hungary, approximately 400 000 provincial Jewish men, women and children had already been deported to the extermination camps in Poland, under the direction of Adolf Eichmann. Only about 200 000 Jews remained in the capital. Eichmann was now preparing to erase the entire Jewish population within a short period of time. Soon after his arrival, Wallenberg organised the creation of a special department at the Swedish Legation, in charge of saving Jews. The staff mainly consisted of Jewish volunteers, who numbered over 300 in the last months of the operation. The Swedish Legation in Budapest was already before Wallenberg’s arrival issuing provisional passports and certificates to Jews with Swedish connections. Wallenberg’s first task became to extend this idea and start mass-producing these protective documents. He had previously learned about the German and Hungarian weakness for external symbolism. Therefore an impressive protective passport (”schutz-pass” in German) printed in yellow and blue with the Three Crowns coat of arms in the middle, was designed. In actual fact, these protective passports had no value what so ever, from the view of international law. With rather shocking and unconventional methods (everything from bribery to blackmail threats) he succeeded to issue more then 10 000 of these protective passports. As Eichmann’s tactics grew increasingly brutal, Wallenberg built up a network of ”Swedish Houses”, where Jews could seek shelter. The number of sheltering Jews in these houses soon rose to about 15 000 people. As a last effort, before disappearing into the Soviet prison system, Wallenberg stopped an ordered massacre of 50 000 Jews in the Jewish ghetto of Budapest. Two days later The Soviet troops arrived finding 120 000 Jews living in Budapest. Some estimations say that Wallenberg must be given credit for having saved approximately 100 000 of them.

According to Dr György Gergely, employed at the special department of the Swedish Legation, Wallenberg had been under Soviet surveillance from 12 January. Supposedly, he had been well treated by the Soviets and was therefore attempting to contact them in order to discuss a possible improvement of conditions for Jewish people. He left with his chauffeur, Vilmos Langfelder, for an arranged meeting 17 January, bringing three suitcases and a large amount of money. Another member of Wallenberg’s staff, Béla Révai claims that Wallenberg never was escorted to this meeting, but immediately arrested after meeting the Soviet army officials. Two German fellow-prisoners of Wallenberg (Ernst Huber and Gusav Rischer) at the Lubianka Prison in Moscow, recount what Wallenberg supposedly told them: Wallenberg and Langfelder (the chauffeur) were stopped in their car, which had got its tyres punctured by Russian soldiers. One must consider that the stories of Huber and Rischer are oral statements made more then 10 years after the actual event. There might be elements of misunderstanding and failing memory decreasing the reliability of the Huber and Risher’s recounts. Anyhow, they continue by describing how Wallenberg and Langfelder were taken to a provisional prison in Budapest to later be deported to Moscow by railway. In Moscow they had been told not to regard themselves as prisoners but as in protective custody. They were shown the Moscow metro-system and walked on foot to the Lubianka Prison. Meanwhile, a Russian officer in Budapest told the rest of the staff that Wallenberg was in their care and would soon return to Stockholm.

Even though the arrest order officially came from the Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence, Bulganin, who usually never issued any orders to the front line, it is not yet fully clear who actually ordered this arrest. When asked, Ambassador Hans Magnusson, formerly responsible for the Wallenberg Dossier at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, promptly answers that it was a command from Stalin himself. He bases this argument on recovered papers about the two Swiss diplomats, whose arrest appeared to have originated from Stalin directly. Assuming that the document is originated Stalin, one might find a connection between the three diplomats. The Soviet leader may have decided to arrest diplomats from neutral countries still operating in Budapest, for some reason.

Except from Wallenberg and Langfelder, the only man working at the Swedish Legation who was arrested and imprisoned in Moscow was a Russian-speaking man with Norwegian origins claiming his name was Thomsen. Later it has become clear that this man actually was born in Russia and that his real name was Grossheim-Krisko. The Russian part of a Swedish-Russian Joint Group working on the Wallenberg case has published interrogations of Grossheim-Krisko (or Thomsen). During one of these interrogations dated in March 1945 he claims that the Swedish Legation had issued protective passports to persons fleeing the Soviet Regime. He also says that fascist capitalists were under Swedish protection. When the interrogator asked whether Grossheim-Krisko saw the Swedish activities in Hungary as proposing a possible threat towards the Soviet Sate, he had answered affirmatively, though not directly accusing Wallenberg. Even if the interrogation-reports are authentic, one has to carefully evaluate them, regarding the nature of the Soviet State during this time. But the information given may indicate what the Soviet authorities thought of Wallenberg. In the report from the Swedish-Russian Working Group, various possible reasons for Wallenberg’s arrest are given. However, it must be emphasised that this question still remains highly uncertain.

The explanation of the Soviet suspicion of espionage is in the report based around the various organisations helping Wallenberg. As mentioned, the War Refugee Board set up Wallenberg’s task in Budapest and the operation was mainly financed by the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. From the Soviet perspective, the WRB and the JOINT were seen as underground networks, regarded almost as espionage organisations. The mistrust to the WRB can be partially understood, since this establishment was in close co-operation with the American Military Intelligence, the Office of Strategic Services. Another fact adding to this is that the OSS representative in Stockholm, Ivar Olsen, carried every message from Washington to Wallenberg. Olsen was known for having made contacts with Soviet agents in the Baltic States. The Soviets knew about the connection between Olsen and Wallenberg, which means that they might have thought that Wallenberg was actually working for the OSS. During the arrest, the Russians took Wallenberg’s belongings. Among these was his pocket-agenda, containing information about future plans for assistance and re-building projects, concerning the Jewish population in Budapest. These plans must have seemed suspicious and not according to the Soviet blueprint for Budapest’s future. It seems quite likely that the Russians thought that Wallenberg was preparing the establishment of an American espionage centre contra the Soviet Union, acting under the disguise of a humanitarian organisation. Wallenberg’s fellow-prisoners, Richer and Huber, have both said that Wallenberg told them how the interrogator had accused him for espionage. In Bernt Schiller’s book ”Why the Russians took Raoul Wallenberg” , the main theses presented suggests that the Soviet Regime suspected a political conspiracy between the Western Powers and Nazi Germany, directed towards bringing down the Soviet Union. Wallenberg, with his close contacts with German Nazis, such as Adolf Eichmann, was, according to Schiller, suspected of taking a part in this conspiracy. The Russians might very well have had such ideas, but no clear evidence indicating that the arrest of Wallenberg was due to this mistrust, is presented.

Another potential reason could be obtained with regard to Wallenberg as a person. He was representing one of the richest and most prominent industrial families of Europe. A main objective of the communist ideology is to create a society based equal distribution of income, but the Wallenberg family was, and still is, a symbol of western capitalism. In the 1951 version of the Soviet Encyclopaedia it is pointed out that the Wallenberg family was an active supporter of German fascism and therefore were evil-minded enemies of the proletarian society-group. That Wallenberg was arrested because of ideological purposes, might just be a partial reason. Yet it has to be considered. Though this could be contradicted by the fact that the Wallenberg-owned company SKF were providing ball bearings to the Soviet aeroplane industry. Not only Wallenberg as a surname could have attracted Russians interest. USSR was badly hit by the war, and in desperate need for any financial resources. Also, the corruption in Soviet bureaucracies is infamous. Undoubtedly Raoul Wallenberg must have known about Nazi plundering of Jewish property and other potentially valuable and important information, interesting for the Russians to get hold of.

The above suggestion leads on to what Hans Magnusson finds as the most probable reason for the arrest, being that the Russians wanted something in return for Wallenberg. He explains how a prioritised task in the Soviet foreign policy was to get back the numerous Soviet citizens that had been left abroad as a consequence of the war. Magnusson continues by, again, referring to the two Swiss diplomats, Feller and Meier, who were arrested at the same point as Wallenberg. They were released in 1946 as a result of diplomatic negotiations between Switzerland and the Soviet Union, where it was agreed that Feller and Meier were to be exchanged with a group of Soviet citizens in Switzerland. The similarities surrounding the circumstances around the two Swiss diplomats and Wallenberg, makes Magnusson believe that Wallenberg was to be used as an object of possible exchange as well. Sweden was hosting a group of five Soviet sailors and 40 sick military personnel, which could have interested the Russians. Though this raises the question why the Russians never proposed an exchange; Magnusson points out that it was not according to Soviet practice to propose direct exchanges. They preferred to leave this to the other side. Yet, Magnusson claims that the Russians did indicate willingness to perform an exchange. But obviously the indication was not clear enough, or the Swedish diplomats not alert enough. The only Swedish diplomat understanding the Soviet actions as indicating a will to perform an exchange, was Barck-Holst, after a talk with a Soviet State official. An explanation for Swedish inaction would be the general belief in Sweden after the war, which was that Wallenberg had been tragically executed in Budapest, shortly after his disappearance.

In the report from the Swedish-Russian Working Group, some reasons, more speculative in nature, are brought up. One of these is that Wallenberg was arrested to recruit him into the Russian secret service. Attempts to recruit war-prisoners were common, and this hypothesis concerning Wallenberg’s arrest, is popular amongst Russian historians, with insight to the methods of the Russian secret agencies. In his memoirs, a former chief for the Scandinavian section at SMERSH, Sinitsyn, has written that he had asked both Abakumov and Molotov to hand Wallenberg over to PGU (foreign espionage) for recruitment. Another possibility is that Wallenberg knew about Russian contacts with Nazi Germany and that his arrest was a way of getting rid of Wallenberg and his knowledge. These prospects may just be speculative with no valuable evidence supporting them, yet they have to be considered.

The question about Wallenberg’s arrest is still being asked. After all of the research done it is still unclear which the most important motive for his arrest was, or if there was any clear motive behind this decision. Perhaps one will have to accept that the real reason for both Wallenberg’s arrest and the subsequent disappearance may never be known.

• Lars G:son Berg, The Book that Disappeared: What happened in Budapest, Vintage Press, New York 1990
• Bernt Schiller, Varför ryssarna tog Raoul Wallenberg (Why the Russians took Raoul Wallenberg), Natur och Kultur, Stockholm 1991
• Bernt Schiller, ”Wallenberg, Raoul”, Nationalencyklopedin Multimedia DVD, Vers. 2.0. Malmö 1998
• Maj von Dardel, Raoul, Rabén & Sjögren. Stockholm 1984
• Raoul Wallenberg – Redovisning från den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen (Raoul Wallenberg – Report from the Swedish-Russian Working Group). Utrikesdepartementet (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Stockholm 2000
• William Korey, The Last Word on Wallenberg? New investigations, New Questions [online]. Available on the World Wide Web: http://www.ajc.org/
• The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. Wallenberg Research [online]. Available on the World Wide Web: http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/
• Personal interview with Ambassador Hans Magnusson, formerly responsible for the Raoul Wallenberg Dossier at the Swedish Foreign Ministry main responsible of the report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group.
• Documents (see appendix) published in Raoul Wallenberg – Redovisning från den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen (Raoul Wallenberg – Report from the Swedish-Russian Working Group). Utrikesdepartementet (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Stockholm 2000

Appendix part (i)

Protective Passport (http://www.historiska.se/activities/press/bild/Holocaust8.jpg)

Appendix part (ii)

Letter from Söderblom (at the Swedish Legation in Moscow) to Dekanov. 31 December 1944.

Unofficial translation:

To
Mr V Dekanozov Peoples Commissioner for foreign affairs.
Moscow, 31 December 1944

Confidential

According to instructions, I have the advantage to … inform You that the Swedish Legation in Budapest has remained in a surrounded city. The composition of the Legation is as followed:

[Raoul Wallenberg's name is the 5th from above, underlined]

After the local authorities had threatened the legation with evacuation through force, it has gone ”underground”.

I would be grateful if it was possible to inform the Soviet military authorities with the above described circumstances, with a request of, when the city has been liberated, aid the members of the legation.

For Your information, I would add that the legation has remained in the Hungarian capital since its presence has been considered necessary to fulfil the interests of the USSR and to the 15000 Jews, who are under the legation’s custody.

I can assure You that all information that could be received by the friendly liaison of Peoples Commissionaire for Foreign Affairs, concerning the fate of those Swedish citizens who remains in Budapest would be highly appreciated.

Signed S Söderblom

Appendix part (iii)

Arrest order concerning Raoul Wallenberg, 17 January 1945.

Unofficial translation:

To the Commander of the 2nd Ukrainian front
Copy to Abakumov
To No. 937 / Zacharov /

Raoul Wallenberg who was encountered at Benczur Street in the eastern part of Budapest has, according to the contra-espionage organization SMERSH, to be arrested and sent to Moscow.

Necessary means for this operation have to be ensured.

Report the time for the departure to Moscow and the name of the responsible accompanier.

Bulganin 1945-01-17

Peoples Commissioner for Defence, Army General

Appendix part (iv)

Arrest order concerning Harald Feller and Max Meier, 17 January 1945.

Unofficial Translation:

Secret

Only copy

To the Commander for the 2nd Ukrainian Front

Copy to Abakumov

To nr 1207 and 1274

Arrest the, in Budapest encountered, Swiss citizens, Max Meier and Gerald Feller, as well as the Slovakian diplomat Jan Spisjak and send then, as in the case of Wallenberg, to Moscow.

This completion of this assignment is under SMERSH responsibility. It is Your responsibility to ensure necessary means according to SMERSH instructions.

Report the time for the departure to Moscow and the name of the responsible accompanier.

Bulganin

1945-01-17

No. 1367 / sj

* Sven Grundberg is 18 years old. Studies in Internatinal College Spain (ICS), in grade 12.
January 2003.